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Abstract:  The  conventional  theory  of  international  trade  is  dominated  by  a  model 
presupposing a legal order that is perfect in its specifications and controllability, binding 
for  all  economic  agents,  no  matter  their  nationality.  World  order  appears  to  be 
cosmopolitan in the sense of Kant. An international private law community such as this, 
however, does not exist. In fact, there is a multitude of legal orders and a territoriality of 
law, leading to problems largely neglected in the traditional theory of international trade. 
They are at the heart of what we would like to call the New Institutional Economics of 
International Transactions (NIEIT) – a research program which started from a monograph 
published in 1990 (see Schmidt-Trenz 1990).  
This paper addresses two questions:  
(1)  Which specific problems emerge in contracts and the contracting process because of 
factors such as the multitude of legal orders and the territoriality of law?    
(2)  What solutions are there to these problems a) on the level of the law, and b) in the 
shadow of the law or completely independent of it (“private ordering”)? How do they 
work from an efficiency point of view?  
We restrict attention to the international exchange of goods. However, the insights gained 
can  be  transferred  to  other  types  of  transactions,  such  as  international  finance 
transactions, direct investment, and investment agreements.  
 
JEL classification: F02, F15, K33  
 
Keywords: conflict of law, international private law, transaction costs, enforcement of 
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I. Introduction 
 
From the beginning, the New Institutional Economics (NIE) has been concerned with 
a lacuna  in  orthodox  economics  –  the  prevailing  attitude  of  ignoring  the  role  of 
institutions required to capture the gains from trade (see Richter [2005]).  Although it 
would certainly be incorrect to say that traditional analysis completely abstracts from 
institutional structures, “there can be little doubt that the usual treatment of institutions 
was  superficial.  The  existence  of  political,  legal,  monetary,  and  other  systems  was 
certainly recognized; but either these systems were regarded as neutral in their effect on 
economic  events  and  ignored,  or  they  were  taken  as  given  and  then  specified  in  so 
perfunctory a way as to suggest that institutional influence was not of much importance” 
(Furubotn and Richter [1991, p. 2]). With regard to state law, the conventional economic 
theory  did not  underestimate  its  role  as  an  institution  of  governance,  but  it took  the 
existence of a well-functioning institution of state law for granted (see Dixit [2004, p. 3]); 
despite the fact, that in “all countries through much of their history, the apparatus of state 
law was very costly, slow, unreliable, biased, corrupt, weak, or simply absent” (Dixit 
[2004, p. 3]).  
Although the New Institutional Economics has meanwhile grown out of its infancy, it has 
surprisingly neglected to deal more closely with a lacuna that looms particularly large – 
the  study  of  international  trade  (see  Yarbrough  and  Yarbrough  [1994]).  With  the 
exception of the theory of multinational firms the orthodox theory of international trade 
has widely neglected that institutions do matter. An elementary legal order is implied in 
the models, but it is not the subject of analysis. The fact that legal differences are also 
economically  relevant  is  -  at  best  -  stated,  but  it  has  not  yet  become  an  object  of 
investigation. Most of the literature is concerned with the movement of goods across 
borders.  A serious  analysis  of  the  international  transaction  as  the  elementary  unit  of 
economic research is still missing, so that the traditional theory of international trade can 
duly be spoken of as “astronomy of the movements of goods” (Boulding [1958, p. 32] 
calls it “a universe of commodities”).
1 Moreover, all the determinants of the pattern of 
                                                   
1 The fruitfulness of this procedure is not disputed here. But there are costs to it. The Law and Economics 
of  private  ordering  has  been  pushed  into  the  background  because  the  analysis  was  facilitated  by  the   3 
trade (factor endowments, technologies, preferences, heterogeneous products and other 
market  imperfections)  mentioned  in  the  so-called  theory  of  “international”  trade  are 
factors that work for trade between different regions of a nation state as well. Hence, this 
theory deals with a special case of the regional division of labor but hardly identifies any 
truly international dimension.  
The  problems  can  best  be  described  in  the  terminology  of  property-rights  analysis. 
Economic transactions consist of  an  exchange of property rights. While for domestic 
transactions the legal foundations and their enforcement through the “protective state” 
(see  Buchanan  [1975,  p.  68])  are  unequivocal,  international  transactions  touch 
a multitude of legal systems and the monopoly of power claimed by each state within its 
boundaries (territoriality of law). Collisions of norms and gaps between different legal 
systems appear, concurring court decisions is often coincidental, and the assistance of the 
judicial and penal institutions in foreign countries is not at all a matter of course. Thus, 
because of the absence of a world state, the property rights of economic agents involved 
in international trade are often incompatibly defined and insufficiently protected.  
Consider the following example: In the autumn of 1981, a Cairo-based company agreed 
to purchase a number of second-hand vehicles from a Belgian exporter. He introduced 
a German shipping agent, who received a Letter of Credit and made out a Bill of Lading 
on the form of a bankrupt Middle Eastern shipping company. These documents were 
presented to a bank in Zurich and immediate payment was made. However, the cars never 
arrived ... (ICC [1986, p. 6]). Actually, things were much more complex; legal battles 
blazed. As several legal orders were involved, it was unclear which law was appropriate.  
Taking  the  territoriality  of  law  as  given,  one  might  conclude  that  international 
transactions, at least when activities are not simultaneous, as they usually are, do not 
come about at all. No international trader can be sure to get a return for what he has given 
up in advance. It seems as if there were almost no sanctions to ensure the success of such 
transactions. That raises the question: how is it that private international transactions do 
take place in spite of these unfavorable conditions?  
                                                                                                                                                          
assumption of a perfect legal order. A division of labor has developed: Economists have been preoccupied 
with the benefits of specialization and exchange, while legal scholars have been focusing on the contractual 
ramifications. The New Institutional Economics of International Transactions can be judged as an attempt 
to reduce these costs.    4 
Our answer is that the increase in international transactions is not so much owing to the 
influence of consciously cooperating governments – international constitutional policy – 
leading to some sort of worldwide “legal centralism”.
2 It is rather thanks to spontaneous 
forces that an almost complete self-regulation of this area of economic life has resulted, 
based on “private ordering”.
3 The large number of institutions spontaneously created “by 
the  economy”  gives  ample  witness  of  this  development.  The  evolution  of  the  Lex 
Mercatoria, the multinational firm, the Incoterms and the information services provided 
by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) may serve as evidence here.
4 This 
distinction between “private ordering” on the one hand and “legal centralism” on the 
other is crucial, although any real order usually rests upon some mixture of both (see 
Epstein  [2004],  Kadens  [2004],  Donahue  Jr.  [2004]).  In  the  international  arena,  this 
mixture tends towards private ordering.  
The  NIEIT  concentrates  on  the  international  aspects  of  private  law,  as  opposed  to 
international public law.
5 It has so far dealt with the multitude of legal orders and the 
territoriality of law by attempting to answer the following four questions (see Schmidt-
Trenz [1990]): 
1. How  can  the  fragmentation  of  legislation  in  various  legal  systems  throughout  the 
world be explained? What is the optimal number of states?  
2. Why are states territorially organized? How can the existence of state boundaries be 
explained  and  where  should  the  boundaries  be  drawn  to  maximize  wealth?  (The 
question of optimal legal areas.) 
3. Which specific problems emerge in contracts and the contracting process because of 
factors such as the multitude of legal orders and the territoriality of law? 
                                                   
2 This term reflects “the view that the justice to which we seek access is a product that is produced – or at 
least distributed – exclusively by the state” (Galanter [1981, p. 1]). Williamson describes the views of 
“legal centralism” as follows: “Most studies of exchange assume that there are efficacious rules of law 
regarding contract disputes and these are applied by the courts in an informed, sophisticated, and low cost 
way” (Williamson [1984, p. 208]).   
3 This expression refers to self-help and agreement on rules for settling disputes that could otherwise be 
brought to court (see Eisenberg [1976]; Galanter [1981, p. 8, 23]; Williamson [1984, p. 208]).  
4 Berman [1983], Trakman [1983] and Benson [1989] give further examples. 
5 Public International Law is one of the subjects covered by the so-called “International Political Economy” 
(see Sandler [1980, p. 12]). Following the tradition of the Public Choice Paradigm, this school of thought 
examines  how the  “productive  state”  in Buchanan’s  (Buchanan [1975]) sense  behaves in international 
affairs. This topic is now well established in economics. This is something, however, that cannot be said of 
the international aspects of private law.    5 
4. What solutions are there to these problems  
(a)  on the level of the law, 
(b)   in the shadow of the law or completely independent of it (“private ordering”)? 
How do they work from an efficiency point of view, thereby focusing on both 
property-rights structures and transaction costs?  
In this article, we will deal with points (3) and (4) (for points (1) and (2) see Schmidt-
Trenz/Schmidtchen 2002). We restrict attention to the international exchange of goods. 
However, the insights gained can be transferred to other types of transactions, such as 
international finance transactions, direct investment, and investment agreements. 
The article is organized as follows:  The second section clarifies the building blocks of 
the NIEIT.  The connection between the fragmentation of law, the territoriality of law and 
constitutional  uncertainty,  which  is  classified  as  the  source  of  transaction  costs  in 
international transactions, is examined in this section. In the third section, an international 
transaction  is  modeled  as  a  strategic  game  and  identified  as  an  international  trade 
dilemma.  The fourth section deals with possible ways to overcome international trade 
dilemmas. Finally, section five provides a summary and some further reflections.  
A final remark with regard to the relationship between the conventional theory and the 
New  Institutional  Economics  seems  adequate.  As  Furubotn  and  Richter  put  it:  New 
Institutional Economics “should not be considered as being a deliberated attempt to set 
up a new and distinct type of doctrine in conflict with conventional theory”; rather, it is 
sensitive  to  institutional  issues  and  “seeks  to  extend  the  range  of  applicability  of 
neoclassical theory by considering how property-rights structures and transaction costs 
affect incentives and economic behavior” (Furubotn and Richter [1991, p. 1]).   
 
II. Building Blocks of New Institutional Economics of International Transactions  
 
1. Transactions as the Elementary Unit of Analysis  
 
In contrast to conventional economics, the New Institutional Economics emphasizes the 
transaction as the elementary unit of analysis (“the institutional economics imperative”): 
“The transaction, rather than a good or service, is regarded as the basic unit of analysis,   6 
the  dimensions  of  which  are  essential  to  pattern  recognition  and  to  efforts  of 
economizing” (Williamson [1986, p. 151]).  In addition, New Institutional Economics 
“seeks to demonstrate that institutions truly matter. Each distinct organizational structure 
is said to  affect incentives and behavior but,  beyond this, institutions  are themselves 
regarded as legitimate objects of economic analysis” (Furubotn and Richter [1991, p. 2]). 
Following North [1989, p. 239] an institution consists, basically, of informal constraints, 
formal  rules,  and  the  enforcement  characteristics  of  both  that  govern  and  shape  the 
interactions  of  human  beings  and  organizations,  in  part  by  helping  them  to  form 
expectations of what others will do. The term transaction refers to economic activities 
and interactions with the potential to create or add value, such as the exchange of goods 
or services, reputation and goodwill. The activities require input from several individuals 
and the interactions are based on explicit or implicit contracts voluntarily made by all the 
parties involved. Typically, these contracts are incomplete.  
In most transactions participants have at their disposal “various actions that increase their 
own gain, while lowering the others’ gain by a greater amount” (Dixit [2004, p. 1]). For 
this whole class of actions Williamson coined the term opportunism.  
Many transactions involve the acquisition or transfer of property rights. Therefore, New 
Institutional Economics focuses on the institution of property rights and on the system of 
norms governing the acquisition or transfer of property rights (see Furubotn and Richter 
[1991,  p.  3]).  Since  the  creation,  utilization,  and  support  of  an  institution  governing 
a transaction requires real resources – transaction costs – serious attention has to be given 
to the role these costs play in the organization of economic activities.  
The  confluence of  several  factors characterizes the subject  matter  of  transaction  cost 
economics, which is a central part of NIE (see Kreps [2004, pp. 594-599]):  
“1. Many important transactions are complex in a variety of ways. They take time to 
complete, with the parties to the transactions having multiple opportunities to act. 
They often involve uncertainty, hidden information, and moral hazard.  
2.  The  parties  to  these  transactions  are  unable,  either  at  the  outset  or  during  the 
transaction,  to  imagine  all  the  possible  contingencies  that  may  arise  or  the 
consequences of those contingencies that they do imagine ...    7 
3.  Both at the outset and as the transaction unfolds, the ultimate terms of the transaction 
are unclear. These terms are worked out as time passes and contingencies arise ...  
4.  To say all this is not to say that the parties enter the transaction blindly. They may be 
quite sophisticated in their attempts to structure the transaction in a way that is likely 
to lead to efficient adaptation ...  
5.  Parties  to  the  transaction-relationship,  in  varying  degrees,  are  increasingly  held 
hostage  by  their  trading  partners,  as  time  passes  and  the  transaction-relationship 
matures ... the parties to the transaction develop transaction specific assets that are of 
value only in this transaction and would be lost if the transaction ends prematurely.  
6.  To  the  extent  that  this  is  true,  a  party  with  transaction-specific  assets  at  risk  is 
potentially the victim of a holdup of the other side.”  
Given conditions 1. – 3. the transaction is incomplete:  
“7. Essential to any incomplete transaction where the parties have transaction-specific 
assets at risk are the rules, conventions and procedures by which the terms of the 
transaction  are adapted  to contingencies that  arise. Those rules,  conventions, and 
procedures  typically  mix  legal  rights,  contractual  terms,  and  custom  to  varying 
degrees. Those rules – in the jargon, the governance of the transaction – are what 
makes one  transaction efficient and  another hopelessly  inefficient” (Kreps  [2004, 
p. 599]).  
 
2. The Diversity and Territoriality of Law  
 
From an economic standpoint, a system of private law serves to fulfill two fundamental 
functions, which Kronman referred to as possessive security and transactional security 
(Kronman [1985]).  Possessive security is established when (1) the property rights which 
“specify the norms of behavior with respect to things that each person must observe in his 
interactions  with  other  persons,  or  bear  the  costs  of  nonobservance”  (Furubotn  and 
Richter [1991, p. 2]) are unambiguously defined and assigned to persons, and (2) these 
rights are protected by “guarantees based on sanctions that are established either by law   8 
or by custom” (Furubotn and Richter [1991, p. 2]).
6 Transactional security is ensured 
when  the  parties  to  a transaction  can  reasonably  expect  that  the  transaction  will  be 
executed as promised.  
A state’s monopoly of power fundamentally guarantees possessive security on its own 
territory and transactional security in domestic transactions.  International transactions, 
however, come into contact with more than one legal system, and therefore also with 
more than one state’s associated monopoly of power.  In this context, lawyers suggest 
making a distinction between three levels: 
(1)  The Capacity to create Law:  A lawmaker can only draft valid law for his territory.  
The legal catchphrase is: Scope of law (= the territorially limited validity of law); 
jurisdiction to prescribe. 
(2)  The Application of Law:  The applicable private law is defined by the conflict-of-
law-rules, also called Private International Law (PIL).  Courts can apply the private 
law of a foreign country. Thus, the applicability of a particular private law is not 
limited territorially. Note, however, that as of today, almost every nation provides for 
its own conflict-of-law-rules. Thus, we even have to deal with collisions of collision 
rules.   
(3)  The Execution of Judgements:  Judgements are acts of state.  The direct effects of 
these judgements end on national boarders.  To be able to have an effect outside of 
the state they are issued in, the cooperation of foreign countries is required.  This is 
the level at which the recognition and enforceability of foreign judgements comes 
into play. 
In short, the capacity to create law and the direct effect of judgements are territorial, 
while the application of private law is not.  Both territorial points pertain directly to the 
sovereignty of states.  Since Savigny, however, states consider matters of sovereignty less 
important  when  it  comes  to  the  application  of  law.    In  this  way,  PIL  overrides 
territoriality.  
PIL  is  a  law  of  conflict;  a  law  over  laws,  a  second  level  law,  or  a meta-law  that 
determines which law to implement when a trade relationship involves more than one 
                                                   
6 Included are forms of „private ordering“ by which individuals try to overcome opportunistic behavior (see 
Furubotn and Richter [1991, pp. 21-22]).    9 
legal system (see Mankowski [2002, p. 118]).  Along with PIL, International Procedural 
Law plays a central role.  It governs, among other things, the following aspects:  “(1) The 
international competence of courts:  Which state’s courts are allowed to make decisions?  
Or from the point of view of the appealed court:  Are the courts of my state allowed to 
decide at all?  (2) The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements ... Can a legal 
title be executed in a foreign country?  (3) The processing of writs in a foreign country…  
(4) The differences in courts granting legal aid, especially as regards their willingness to 
take evidence:  Can one count on the assistance of local courts when having to collect 
evidence  in  a  foreign  country?”    (Mankowski  [2002,  pp.  118  f.]  Translation  from 
German.) 
 
3. Constitutional Uncertainty as a Source of Transaction Costs  
 
Due to the absence of a world-wide protective state, it is common for the property rights 
of economic agents involved in foreign trade to be incompatibly defined and inadequately 
protected.  For this reason, a specific form of uncertainty in the domain of private foreign 
trade relationships emerges, which is called constitutional uncertainty (see Schmidt-Trenz 
and Schmidtchen [1991]).  This is an uncertainty that plays a role in the execution of both 
complete and incomplete contracts. Complete contracts determine not only the behavior 
of the involved parties in any state of the world, but also which law the contract is subject 
to, and which court should have jurisdiction.  But even if the contract is complete in this 
respect, uncertainty concerning the applicable law remains.  Incidentally, the law chosen 
by the contract parties and the decision of the court could conflict with each other.  The 
reason is that the laws applied by the court could mandate that transactions with foreign 
contacts will follow a certain PIL.  This PIL can, however, require the use of a different 
applicable law than the one the parties have chosen.  If the contract contains no rules 
pertaining  to  applicable  law,  the  applicable  PIL  is  first  determined  by  International 
Procedural Law.  In applying the PIL thus determined, the applicable law is established. 
If a judgement is to be enforced and the defendant no longer has assets in the country 
where the judgement was made, then the problem of recognition and enforcement abroad   10
emerges.  It becomes obvious that constitutional uncertainty creates contracting problems 
that are reflected by transaction costs for international economic actors.   
According to the view presented here, constitutional uncertainty can be traced back to 
problems in rendering and executing judgements –  two problems that do not arise in this 
form in the domestic economy.
7 Also the so-called sovereignty risk, for instance in the 
form of  risks  of  expropriation and  repudiation  (see Schnitzer  [2002]; general  Herring 
[1984]), are a part of constitutional uncertainty. 
It should be mentioned that uncertainty and risks are indeed discussed in foreign trade 
literature,  however  this  literature  does  not  deal  with  what  we  call  constitutional 
uncertainty.  The starting point of the mentioned approaches is the idea that “the structure 
of  foreign  trade  is  affected  by  random  shocks  that  originate  from  various  sources” 
(Helpman [1985, p. 72]).  As Pomery [1984, p. 420] aptly put it: Uncertainty is “imposed, 
as a model-exogenous datum, on preferences, technology or endowments.”  The same 
applies to price fluctuation.  
 
4. Institutional Alternatives in Foreign Trade    
 
There  is  a  continuum  of  possible  institutional  alternatives  in  international  trade:  the 
classical contract of sale on the one side and the foundation of subsidiaries abroad on the 
other, be it as an independent company with an assembly/subassembly or manufacturing 
plant or be it as a trading company.  
There are also plenty of intermediate forms of contractual organization which are used in 
international  trade,  amongst  which  are  license  contracts  (licensing),  franchising, 
                                                   
7 The relevance of this factor may be demonstrated by a recent example: foreign trade with China.  
German foreign trade firms frequently complain about unreliable Chinese business partners: “The states of 
mind of the firms involved in trade with China meanwhile reach from sheer anger to utter despair.” So the 
comment  by  an  important  Hamburg  foreign  trade  corporation  reported  in  a  newspaper  (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, No 237: 13; 10. 11. 1988). The report continues: “Even small deviations in the bills of 
delivery induce the Chinese buyers to refuse to honor the bills submitted against letters of credit. The 
merchandise is then paid a long time after its arrival – often only on the condition of massive concessions 
as for prices. Since it is only with high cost – if at all – that it can be shipped back, the German exporter is 
‘actually exposed to pure blackmail’. The spokesman of the firm concerned speaks of a ‘partly lawless 
situation’ (...). A workable commercial legislation does not exist and thus there is no imperative need to 
fulfil  a contract.”  Ibid.  Especially  characteristic  –  and  that  may  hold  as  an  additional  proof  of  our 
proposition – is what kind of firms show opportunistic behavior in China. It does not refer to the old and   11
contractual  production  etc.  –  i.e.  “joint  ventures  entered  into  with  a  partner  abroad” 
(Walsh [1971, p. 70]). The term “joint venture” is thus understood in a broad sense as 
“a type of association which implies collaboration for more than a very transitory period” 
(Friedman and Kalmanoff [1981, p. 6]).  
In order to assess the degree of internationalization of a firm structure we refer to the 
relative amount of capital and management services invested abroad. This leads us to 
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Fig. 1: International institutional structures  
 
These institutional alternatives for doing international business find their NIE pendant in 
well-discussed governance structures:  
1. market     (exports/imports),  
2. relational contract  (“joint venture” in a broad sense),  
3. hierarchy     (subsidiaries).  
                                                                                                                                                          
large Chinese foreign trade corporations, but is rather a matter of the innumerable new companies founded 
in the provinces and cities.     12
Evidently,  figure  1  does  not  offer  but  a  very  rough  differentiation.  A  more  precise 
analysis would have to attempt to differentiate the institutional alternatives governing 
international  transactions  somewhat  further.
8  This,  however,  requires  a  comparative 
institutional analysis of prototypes, which, in foreign trade theory, is still in its infancy.
9  
Two remarks seem necessary at this stage.  
To begin with, the market as a coordination mechanism does of course also rest upon 
contracts. The simple sale contract (spot contract), which MacNeil – in a theoretical view 
– calls a “classical contract” (see MacNeil [1974, p. 1978]), is typical. This is the kind of 
contract  that neoclassical theory implicitly presupposes.  In a  world in which  specific 
investment (sunk costs), opportunism and bounded rationality are absent, i.e. in a world 
without  transaction costs,  the use of  this type of contracts is absolutely sufficient for 
efficiency. The identity of the transaction partner does not matter: “faceless buyers” are 
confronted  with  “faceless  sellers”  and  each  contract  of  sale  refers  to  a discrete 
transaction:  “sharp  in by clear  agreement; sharp out by  clear  performance”  (MacNeil 
[1974]). In a world with positive transaction costs, however, the relevance of this kind of 
contracts is rather limited. Such a world is governed by relational contracts, which are to 
regulate contractual relations in the shadow of specific investments.  
Secondly, we would like to emphasize that we interpret hierarchy as a contractual relation 
(between employer and employee) as well. We view it as a borderline case of relational 
contracts, whereas the contemporary economic literature looks at hierarchy as something 
different  from  a  relational  contract.  The  traditional  theory  of  the  multinational  firm 
primarily deals with the extreme case of hierarchy.  
In the framework of a NIE program of research one would have to clarify in detail why 
different types of foreign trade chains can be observed at one certain point in time and 
why they do change with the course of time. One would also have to ask why certain 
foreign activities – be it activities of production in a narrow sense, activities of sale or 
different  services  –  are  taken  on  by  domestic  instead  of  foreign  agents.  To  us,  the 
                                                   
8  See,  for  instance,  the  enumeration  by  the  Karenberg  and  Meissner  study  group  of  Schmalenbach-
Gesellschaft [1983, pp. 3-12]. They mention for example: intermediation by a free agent, by a resident; 
creation  of  a sale/purchase  company,  of  a  service  center,  of  an  assembly/subassembly  plant;  tolling; 
manufacturing  plants; independent enterprise;  contracts  for  the  use  of technical  know-how, trade-mark 
rights, rights to sale.    13
territoriality  of  law  and  the  resulting  constitutional  uncertainty  represent  the  clue  to 
answering these questions.  
As we will essentially analyze foreign trade activities one might get the impression that 
the approach we launch is exclusively applicable to foreign trade. This impression is, 
however,  misleading.  What  we  do  is  rather  develop  a  paradigm  of  institutional 
economics, which we consider applicable to any kind of international business relations. 
We not only refer to “visible” trade but also to the exchange of services, esp. of financial 
services.  
 
III.  The International Trade Dilemma 
 
Consider a potential international transaction between a member of state A and a member 
of State E. We assume both actors to be risk neutral. Adam, a citizen of state A, promises 
to deliver a good which he values with X in exchange for a good, to be delivered by Eve, 
a citizen of country E, valued with Y by both. Eve’s valuation of the good delivered by A 
is denoted Z. We assume Z > Y > X > 0. Hence, the parties would mutually benefit if 
both promises were fulfilled.
10 However, this condition is not sufficient to guarantee that 
the parties will actually act as agreed: the agreement is not self-enforcing.
11 Assume that 
Eve can observe Adam’s move before making her own decision. The extensive form of 









                                                                                                                                                          
9 Buckley [1985b, pp. 39-59, see esp. p. 51] tries to offer a detailed typology. Yet it obviously rests on the 
dualism of “market” versus “hierarchy”. The category of “relational contracts” is missing.  










Fig. 2: The trade game in extensive form 
 
Figure 3 shows the game in the strategic or normal form.  
 




Y – X, Z – Y 
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Fig. 3: The trade game in normal form 
 
Adam’s payoff is the first entry in the brackets (cells of the matrix), Eve’s payoff is the 
second. Adam has two strategies: {in, out}. The strategy in means delivering the good; 
strategy  out can  be  interpreted  as  a  national  transaction  (among  citizens of  state  A), 
which yields a net gain of zero.  
                                                                                                                                                          
11 An analysis of an  international transaction considered as a prisoner’s dilemma game, which  implies 













Eve has two strategies {cheat, honor}. It is common knowledge that the game is going to 
be played only once. If Eve follows through with the agreement, both Adam and Eve get 
a positive payoff.  
However,  Eve can instead take the opportunistic  action  “cheat”,  which will yield her 
a larger payoff than choosing “honor” but Adam a negative payoff. Eve is tempted to 
cheat instead of honor the agreement. In anticipation of Eve’s opportunism, however, 
Adam chooses out. The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game is the strategy 
profile (out, cheat). The equilibrium is Pareto-inefficient, since both parties would have 
been  better  off  playing  the  path  (in,  honor).  Let  us  call  this  kind  of  inefficiency 
“coordination inefficiency”.  
In the normal form, strategy profile (out, cheat) is the only Nash equilibrium (in pure 
strategies). Eve could promise she will choose “honor”, but in the absence of some form 
of sanction the promise is not credible.  
The  inefficiency  is due  to the lack of  any mechanism that protects Adam’s interests. 
From  Adam’s  point  of  view,  the  costs  of  enforcing  the  terms  of  the  agreement  are 
infinite. Adam’s not honoring the agreement leads to opportunity costs in terms of Z – X, 
which are shared in accordance with the terms of trade Y. Hence, both parties would 
agree to employ an institution that makes the option in Adam’s preferred choice as long 
as the gain from cooperation Z – X exceeds the costs of this device.  
 
IV.  Ways to Overcome the International Trade Dilemma  
 
To overcome the international trade dilemma the trading game must be altered in such 
a way  that  it  is  individually  rational  for  Eve  to  choose  the  cooperative  strategy.  In 
principle, there are three ways to accomplish that: contract law, private ordering, and 
international constitutional policy.  
 
1. Contract Law 
 
A contract may be defined in a comprehensive manner as an agreement about behavior 
that is intended to be enforced (see Watson [2002, p. 115]). There are three methods of   16
contract enforcement: self-enforcement, external enforcement and automatic enforcement 
(see Watson [2002, p. 116]). A contract is self-enforcing if the parties to the contract have 
the individual incentives to abide by the terms of the contract. A contract is defined as 
externally enforced if the parties are motivated to carry it out by the actions of an external 
player, such as a judge or arbitrator. Finally, a contract is automatically fulfilled if it is 
carried out instantaneously by the agreement itself. We will limit our attention to self- 
and externally enforced contracts.  
Suppose the parties make monetary transfers. First, Adam and Eve agree to play (in, 
honor), and, second, specify damages c > Y to be paid by Eve if caught cheating. Instead 
of the game in Fig. 3, which is called the underlying game, the players play the game 
depicted  in  Fig.  4,  which  is  called  the  induced  game.  This  game  adds  the  expected 
transfers to the underlying game, with q denoting the probability of a transfer.  
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Fig. 4: The induced game  
 
The Nash equilibrium of the induced game is (out, cheat), since q is expected to be zero. 
In other words, the agreement with regard to the transfers is not self-enforcing.  
An agreement to play (in, honor) is a self-enforced contract only if (in, honor) is a Nash 
equilibrium, which is the case if  c q Z Y Z × - ³ - . Since this inequality fails to hold, the 
players cannot rely on self-enforcement to support the outcome (in, honor).  
The participation of a third party, whose actions serve to change the nature of the game 
between Adam and Eve, may be a way out. Suppose Adam and Eve agree to make the   17
promises to exchange legally binding.  That is, to give the promises a form that allows 
a third party – the protective state – to use force in case of a breach.  
The sanction potential of  contract  law can be represented in  the  form of  a sanctions 
matrix.  This matrix is a payoff matrix, which is added to the matrix of the original game 
(see fig. 3) and leads to an induced game with payoffs as depicted in fig. 4.  In terms of 
game  theory,  the  sanctions  matrix  stands  for  a  binding  agreement  that  is  common 
knowledge and will be indisputably enforced by a third party.  This binding agreement 
can be interpreted as if both actors wrote a contract and gave it to the third party.  The 
third party can then – without cost - monitor the compliance with the contract and will 
therefore realize  with certainty  if the mutual obligations have been fulfilled,  and can 
penalize breaches of contract like an angel of vengeance (see Friedman [1991, p. 13]).  
Because of this set up, the third party is not a “real” player; rather, it acts as a kind of 
machine whose execution - through the triggering of a certain signal - can no longer be 
stopped.  In other words, the third party is incapable of being corrupted.   
The equilibrium of the new induced game is an equilibrium in cooperative strategies, if 
c q Z Y Z × - ³ - . It becomes obvious that the function of law in this context is to shift 
the equilibrium, or more exactly, to make the cooperative strategy into an equilibrium 
strategy.  Regrettably, the aforementioned model of an externally enforced contract does 
not encompass the case of constitutional uncertainty that interests us here.  If there were 
a world-wide monopoly on power, then this would be adequate – but we are confronted 
with a multitude of legal orders as well as the territoriality of law and therefore with 
a multi-polar system of the monopoly of power.  Therefore, we have as many sanction 
matrices as there are nation states.   
Since there are several courts in the world – Adam’s home court, Eve’s home court, or 
any other court in the world – which court has jurisdiction? Which law is applicable 
according  to  private  international  law?  Does  this  law  allow  the  players  to  write 
a complete contract, which specifies a transfer in case of a breach of contract? Courts do 
not always enforce what players write into their contracts; they often impose transfers on 
the  basis  of  certain  legal  principles.  Breach  remedies  include  expectation  damages, 
reliance damages, restitution damages – whatever the court awards.    18
Laws of conflict accompanied by bilateral or multilateral agreements among sovereign 
states define the options for filing a suit. It is possible that no court accepts jurisdiction or 
that several courts claim jurisdiction.  
If Adam prevails, then an additional problem arises if Eve does not hold assets in the 
country  where  the  judgement  was  made.  In  this  case,  the court  ruling only  becomes 
effective  as  an  enforcement device  if  it  is  acknowledged  in  a state  where  Eve  holds 
assets.  
This list of problems suggests not to consider constitutional uncertainty as a kind of risk 
but rather as  an  instance of true  or  Knightion uncertainty. This uncertainty as  to the 
values of q and c increases the transactions costs of international trade. For the previously 
mentioned reasons, it is in no way certain that the induced game actually guarantees an 
equilibrium in cooperative strategies. 
 
2. Private Ordering 
 
One cannot rely on court ordering alone to overcome contractual hazards. Williamson 
emphasizes  an  important  reason  for  this:  imperfect  legal  centralism.  Courts  operate 
subject  to  opportunistic  behavior  of  lawyers  and  bounded  rationality  of  judges.  The 
diversity and territoriality of law are further sources of imperfection of court ordering 
(see  Schmidtchen  [1995]).    Nevertheless,  the  international  trade  dilemma  can  be 
overcome by means of private ordering.  
Private ordering refers to institutions or rules for settling conflicts in the absence of – or 
as amendments to – courts (see Eisenberg [1976]; Galanter [1981, pp. 8, 23]; Williamson 
[1984, p. 208]; Dixit [2004]). Although the distinction between “private ordering” on the 
one hand and “legal centralism” on the other is crucial, in reality any order is usually 
based on a mixture.  
One  reason  why  we  can  observe  an  extensive  international  division  of  labor  in  the 
presence of constitutional uncertainty is the fact that interactions do not take place once, 
but repeatedly: international traders play iterated games. The other reason would be a 
direct manipulation of the payoff structure in the one-shot game (of fig. 3).    19
A  game  is  “iterated”  if  the  single  transaction  is  embedded  in  a  long-term  contract 
relationship, which gives scope for conditional cooperative behavior. Let us examine the 
situation  where  Adam  and  Eve  experience  a  finitely  repeated  game  with  uncertainty 
about  the  future.  This  game has  a  finite number of  stage games, but  the  players are 
uncertain about when the game ends. Within a repeated interaction, Adam and Eve can 
adopt  conditional  punishment  strategies  that  induce  the  trading  partner  to  honor  the 
contract. These strategies allow for punishing other players if they deviate form the terms 
of the agreement. If the prospect of punishment is sufficiently severe, Adam and Eve will 
be deterred from deviation.  
Suppose it is common knowledge that a stage game as represented by fig. 3 is repeated 
with a positive probability. For the sake of simplicity, this probability is assumed to be 
the same for all periods.  
As  long  as  both  players  comply  with  the  contract,  Eve’s  stream  of  payoffs  can  be 







, with p = ]0,1[ denoting the discount factor. Parameter p reflects both the 
probability that the game continues at least one more period and the time preference.  
Supposing  that  Eve’s  cheating  is  detected  immediately  and  that  Adam  reacts  by 
terminating the interaction on a permanent basis (grim strategy) Eve’s stream of payoffs 
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With condition (d) met, Adam will deliver X in each stage game.    20
Thus, neither Adam nor Eve stand to gain by deviating from the terms of the contract.
12  
The reasoning assumes that Eve’s deviating action is immediately detected, and Eve must 
expect a grim punishment in the form of a permanent collapse of the mutually beneficial 
arrangement. But the idea can be extended to more complex situations, characterized by 
less  than  perfect  detection  of  deviation,  random  matching  of  trade  partner,  and  the 
existence of different behavior types (see Dixit [2004, pp. 97-123]).  
Even under anonymity, cooperation can be explained if the international transaction is 
carried out by one or several mediators, e.g., export-import houses, that – due to iteration 
– maintain a long-term self-enforcing business relationship.
13 In such a case Adam and 
Eve draw up enforceable contracts with domestic business partners, and the international 
transaction and the risk associated with it lies in the hands of international traders who 
rely on private ordering.  
The widespread institution of “documentary letters of credit” works in a similar way. 
Here, international payments are carried out by international correspondent banks, which 
stand in a long-term relationship with each other and therefore act cooperatively without 
the need for legal centralism.
14  
Just as cooperation can be brought about by a manipulation of the probability of a new 
business deal, it can be influenced by the manipulation of Eve’s payoff. One way to 
ensure cooperation is through “hands-tying” (see Kronman [1985]) by sinking specific 
investments or transferring hostages – think of bank guarantees – so that the cooperative 
behavior is induced.  
A hostage is a good valuable only to the “giver”. Let hE be Eve’s hostage to Adam. 
Posting the hostage by Eve yields, e.g. uE(hE) = Y and uA(hE) = 0, with uA, uE representing 
the value of the hostage to Adam and Eve, respectively. Hostage giving would change 
                                                   
12 Consider the following strategies: Adam’s strategy is “Deliver so long as Eve has not chosen cheat in the 
past; but terminate the relationship in response to cheat”; Eve’s strategy is “always honor”.  
For this to be an equilibrium, neither Adam nor Eve should stand to gain by deviating from their strategies.  
This is the case if condition (d) is met.  
13 See Schmidt-Trenz and Schmidtchen [1991, p. 335], where the function of a mediator is discussed for an 
iterated prisoner’s dilemma game in which the players play the Tit-for-Tat strategy.  
14 Explanation of changes in international trade should, therefore, refer to the nexus between trade and 
financial  services.  Usually,  there  is  a  strong  relationship  between  the  volume  and  the  structure  of 
international trade and the evolution of its institutional framework.    21
Eve’s  payoff  from  cheating  to  Z  –  Y,  which  is  identical  to  her  honor-payoff.  Thus, 
bilateral contractual compliance would be induced.
15  
Specific  investments  deserve  a  few  additional  remarks  in  this  context,  because  the 
specificity of resources is usually seen as a reason for the creation of multinational firms 
(see Helpman [1984]). The latter appear as an institutional safeguard, which serves as 
protection against opportunistic behavior consisting of attempts to “expropriate” someone 
of  the  quasirents  that  are  a  result  of  resource  specificity.  In  this  context,  resource 
specificity  is  usually  being  treated  as  an exogenous  variable  (see  Helpman  [1984,  p. 
455]).  In  the  light  of  the  approach  supported  here,  however,  this  premise  seems 
misleading. What matters is rather to explain this specificity, which essentially represents 
a “commitment”  and  thus  is  a  precondition  for  the  practicability  of  international 
transactions.  
 
3. International Constitutional Policy  
 
Even  though  the  NIEIT  still  has  not  developed  a  cohesive  conception  of  economic 
politics (but see Dixit [2004, ch. 6]), it offers the building blocks for an international 
economic  policy.    The  central  points  are,  first,  the  goal  of  establishing  international 
possessive and transactional security, and second, the extent to which private ordering 
could  be  made  more  effective  (and  cheaper)  through  state  actions.    The  latter  is 
significant insofar as private ordering takes place in the shadow of the law.  It is therefore 
not just about the option of legal centralism or private ordering, but also about assisting 
private ordering through legal centralism. 
The  economic  policy  must  be  predominantly  international  “Ordnungspolitik”.
16 
“Ordnungspolitik”  consists  of  measures  shaping  what  Douglas  North  called  the 
“institutional  environment”.  International  “Ordnungspolitik”  has  so  far  dealt  almost 
entirely  with  questions  that  are  associated  with  public  law  (constitutional  and 
administrative law).  The private law branch is underdeveloped.  An economic paradigm 
                                                   
15 Note that the assumption uA(hE) = 0 is crucial. If Adam knows that Eve values the hostage at Y, he might 
be tempted to propose a bargain. A way out is to deposit the hostage with an honest trustee.  
16 A description of a public policy termed “Ordnungspolitik” in Germany can be found in Schmidtchen 
[1984].    22
for an international body of private law exists only as an outline.  Whoever reads our 
textbooks gets the impression that all that is needed is to dismantle trade barriers - such as 
tariffs, import quotas, or administrative protectionism - and we would already have quasi-
domestic economic conditions in the international arena.  This is by no means the case.  
When the conditions of free trade are given, constitutional uncertainty is not eliminated 
because of the diversity and territoriality of private law. 
Based on the principles of institutional economics, international “Ordnungspolitik” must 
generally focus on the question of how constitutional uncertainty in foreign trade can be 
avoided.  Naturally, one immediately thinks of the unification or harmonization of law.  
This can occur in international procedural law, in PIL, and in substantive law (for an 
excellent overview, see Mankowski [2002]).  In Europe, international procedural law is 
part of the attempt to enhance judicial collaboration and create a comprehensive legal 
area in Europe.  The law of liability as a part of PIL is already in the process of being 
unified in Europe, and it has produced, to a degree, unity and legislative certainty which 
could  not  be  achieved  through  a  harmonization  of  national contract  laws because  of 
political restrictions (see Mankowski [2002, p.  132]).  Meanwhile, the initiation of a 
unified European civil law code is being considered.  It is controversial whether unified 
law should be generated by a competition of legal systems or through a central design 
(see Yearbook for New Political Economy, vol. 17 [1998], vol. 18 [1999]; Schmidtchen 
and Neunzig [2004]; Schmidtchen [2006]).  But of all things, it should not be forgotten 
that constitutional uncertainty can be reduced not only by “Ordnungspolitik” but also by 
spontaneous  order.    In  this  context,  one  should  remember  the  merchant  law  (Lex 
Mercatoria)  as  a  kind  of  so-called  “spontaneously  created  law”  and  its  relation  with 
international arbitral jurisdiction (see Milgrom, North and Weingast [1990]; Schmidtchen 
[2002]).  But from an economic standpoint, these questions are not even formulated – not 
to mention the answers.  
 
V.  Conclusion  
 
Through almost all ages, lawyers have been concerned with the questions resulting from 
the diversity and territoriality of law; economists have dealt with them only rarely. This is   23
all the more amazing as both issues should have taken a prominent place on the agenda of 
international trade theory, at least with the advent of New Institutional Economics (i.e. 
property  rights  analysis,  contract  theory,  transaction  cost  economics,  constitutional 
economics).  
This paper focuses on the problems of the coordination of foreign trade activities in the 
shadow  of  the  fragmentation  and  the  territoriality  of  law.  The  fragmentation  and 
territoriality of  law result  in the  emergence of  a  special kind of  uncertainty which is 
reflected in corresponding transaction costs.  
We  attribute  the  fact  that  international  trade  takes  place  smoothly  in  spite  of  these 
unfavorable circumstances to spontaneous forces, which have resulted in almost complete 
self-regulation of this area of economic life, based on private initiative. The category of 
“relational contracts” is of predominant  importance in international trade.  It  refers  to 
contracts  as  governance  structures  (frameworks)  built  for  long-term  relationships 
allowing for several – or many – transactions. The antipodes, i.e., discrete transactions 
between anonymous agents (trade between “faceless buyers and sellers”), would hardly 
work  in  international  trade.  This  requires  a  developed  legal  system  and  protective 
safeguards as in an ideal domestic economy.  
Numerous analyses confirm the impression that foreign trade is dominated by long-term 
business relationships. To be more precise, we would like to speak of the so-called F-
connections mentioned by Ben-Porath [1980]. Thus, we may hypothesize that foreign 
trade is dominated by the categories (a) family, (b) trade friendship, and (c) firms.  
As  for  the  institutional  arrangement  “family”,  we  only  mention  the  Jewish  trading 
network of the Middle Ages. The formation of trade clubs (see Carr and Landa [1983] 
and Cooter and Landa [1984]; Greif [1993]) can be classified as “trade friendships”, of 
which the Hanseatic League is an example. Also the multinational firm receives a new 
justification on this basis. That is, each form of vertical integration across state borders 
can be  regarded  as  a means  to  construct  those indispensable  reciprocal  relationships, 
which prove self-supporting in the absence of effective protective authorities. Managers 
of associated firms find themselves in this kind of “lock-in” relationship, which ensures, 
through a high probability of the iteration of a stage game, cooperative behavior with 
respect to an international transaction that has been transferred into the (multi-national)   24
firm. Here, we maintain, lies a cause, previously overlooked, for striving towards vertical 
integration  observed  particularly  in  international  economic  relations.  On  the  basis  of 
“blackboard economics” a general answer cannot be found to the question of what kind 
of institutional structure will be chosen in a concrete case. To us, the “investment in 
trust” is the decisive variable. Our approach therefore regards direct investment as a way 
of  transforming transactional  insecurity into possessive insecurity.  In the view of the 
territoriality of law this seems at first glance a comparatively costly procedure, since the 
property  of  a  person  or  organization  is  exposed  to  the  arbitrariness  of  a  foreign 
government. But in our understanding, direct investment is rather apt to be an investment 
in  trust  and  amounts  to  a  signaling  activity  an  international  transaction  would  not 
materialize without.   
Considering the dominance of the aforementioned F-connections one notices that foreign 
trade has only  little  in common with the  “Great  Society” presented by Hayek  [1973, 
p. 29],  as  there  is  no  safeguard  for  the  general  and  abstract  rules,  which  make  an 
interaction of anonymous partners possible. What is much more vital to foreign trade is 
the  identity  of  the  trade  partner,  the  F-connection.  The  tendency  to  “internalize” 
transactions is therefore more pronounced here than in domestic trade.  
However, these forms of “private ordering”, which compensate for the missing “legal 
centralism” in the international arena, may not be a first best solution, since the extent of 
division of labor is less compared to a “Great Society”. This leads to the question to what 
extent constitutional policy can bring us nearer to a worldwide “Great Society” with a 
legal centralism of a cosmopolitan type. In this setting, constitutional policy has the task 
of disclosing possible deadlocks or dilemmas in the spontaneous formation of institutions 
and  of  promoting  and  overcoming  constitutional  uncertainty  by  providing  a  bridge 
between different national legal systems.  
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